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Abstract: European Union countries have implemented widespread reforms to product 
markets in order to stimulate competition, innovation and economic growth. We provide 
empirical evidence that the reforms carried out under the EU Single Market Programme 
(SMP) were associated with increased product market competition, as measured by a 
reduction in average profitability, and with a subsequent increase in innovation intensity 
and productivity growth for manufacturing sectors. In our analysis we exploit exogenous 
variation in the expected impact of the SMP across countries and industries to identify the 
effects of reforms on average profitability, and the effects of profitability on innovation 
and productivity growth.  
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Executive Summary 
 
Over the last twenty years EU member states and other OECD countries have 
implemented widespread reforms to product markets, aiming to stimulate competition and 
improve economic performance. Economic theory also suggests that changes in the degree 
of product market competition can influence innovative activity, and policy-makers in 
many EU countries have appealed to further competition-enhancing reforms as a way to 
raise rates of innovation and growth. In order to shed light on whether product market 
reforms are likely to help in achieving these goals, this paper investigates the impact that 
past reforms, in the form of the Single Market Programme (SMP), had on innovation 
activity in the EU. 
The paper provides empirical evidence that the reforms carried out under the SMP were 
associated with increased product market competition, as measured by a reduction in 
average profitability, and with a subsequent increase in innovation intensity and 
productivity growth for manufacturing sectors. In our analysis we exploit exogenous 
variation in the expected impact of the SMP across countries and industries to identify the 
effects of reforms on average profitability, and the effects of profitability on innovation 
and productivity growth.  
Our results have a bearing on the expected effects of possible future reforms, for example 
those being considered under the Lisbon Agenda. Our findings suggest that reforms that 
put pressure on firm profitability are likely to lead to increased innovation, all else equal. 
This suggests that such reforms could at least go some way towards increasing innovation 
intensity within the EU.  
     3
1 Introduction 
Over the last twenty years EU member states and other OECD countries have 
implemented widespread reforms to product markets, aiming to stimulate competition and 
improve economic performance.
1 Economic theory also suggests that changes in the 
degree of product market competition can influence innovative activity, and policy-makers 
in many EU countries have appealed to further competition-enhancing reforms as a way to 
raise rates of innovation and growth.
2 In order to shed light on whether product market 
reforms are likely to help in achieving these goals, this paper investigates the impact that 
past reforms, in the form of the Single Market Programme (SMP), had on innovation 
activity in the EU. 
Our main contribution is to exploit variation in the timing and intensity of the Single 
Market Programme across industries and EU countries, and the fact that some countries 
were part of the EU while others were not, to provide exogenous variation in product 
market conditions. The use of these time varying, country-industry level indicators allows 
us to identify the impact of product market reforms from other changes in the economic 
environment. 
In addition, we consider the effect of product market reforms on the level of available 
profits, or rents, to be the key channel through which they affect firms’ incentives to 
innovate. This is in contrast to studies that relate product market reforms directly to 
outcomes. As well as being motivated by economic theory, our approach allows us to say 
something about the potential impact of future product market reforms on innovation and 
productivity growth; an important question in the context of the EU’s Lisbon Agenda. 
The SMP was a significant, large-scale programme of reforms carried out by EU member 
states in the early 1990s that included the removal of barriers to entry and regulatory 
barriers to trade. Extensive surveys and analysis carried out by the European Commission 
in advance of the implementation of the SMP identified industries and countries that were 
                                                 
1 See Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005) for a discussion of recent reforms and Buigues et al (1990) for a 
discussion of earlier reforms.  
2 Lower rates of innovation and adoption of best practice technologies in EU countries are widely seen as 
reasons for lagging EU productivity growth. With this in mind, the European Council has set a target to raise 
R&D investment to 3% of the EU’s GDP (the Barcelona target), and the Lisbon Agenda contains an 
aspiration to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by the 
end of the current decade.     4
expected to be affected by the reforms to different extents. We use this information to 
construct indicators of reform that vary differentially over time across countries and 
industries. We focus our empirical analysis on the manufacturing sector, as this is where 
the product market reforms undertaken as part of the Single Market Programme had the 
greatest impact, and where the majority of research and development (R&D) is carried 
out.
 3 
Our findings suggest that the product market reforms associated with the SMP did lead to 
an increase in product market competition (as measured by a reduction in average 
profitability) in affected countries and industries. In turn we find that increased 
competition led to an increase in R&D investment in manufacturing industries. Finally, we 
find evidence consistent with increased R&D intensity being the primary route through 
which product market reforms translate into faster Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
growth. However, we also find some evidence that the SMP may have had an additional 
direct and negative impact on R&D intensity and TFP growth in some high-tech 
manufacturing industries with heavy reliance on public procurement. 
This paper relates to two key strands in the empirical literature. First, there are a number 
of studies investigating the relationships between competition, innovation and productivity 
growth using firm-level data within a single country. These include the studies of Nickell 
(1996), Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999), and Aghion et al (2005a,b), which 
relate competition to innovation, and studies looking at the effects of trade liberalisation 
on productivity, for example, Aitken and Harrison (1999), Pavcnik (2002) and Javorcik 
(2004). These all use variation in product market conditions across industries within a 
country.
4 In contrast, we use variation in institutions and reforms across countries.  
Secondly, there is a small but growing literature investigating the impact of product 
market reforms using data across countries. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004) relate a large 
number of reforms to growth in TFP across OECD economies. They assume that product 
market reforms affect the rate of TFP convergence across countries and industries, and 
                                                 
3 Network industries (telecommunications, post, electricity, water, gas, airlines and rail) also experienced 
substantial reforms. However, the nature of reforms and the processes driving innovation and technology 
transfer in these industries differ substantially from the rest of the economy and would required detailed 
modelling of each industry. 
4 Less related to our work is an empirical IO literature; for example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and 
Berry (1992), where the emphasis is on entry in well defined, oligopolistic markets and on endogeneity of 
market structure, and Olley and Pakes (1996) which investigates the effects of deregulation on aggregate 
productivity growth and the underlying reallocation mechanism in one particular industry.     5
find some evidence that the impact of reforms is larger for countries further behind the 
frontier. A key limitation of their analysis is that they only have time-varying measures of 
product market reforms for a small number of network industries. For the rest of the 
economy they use a single cross-section of regulation indicators for 1998, near the end of 
the sample period they consider. Alesina et al (2005) look at the impact of deregulation 
and privatisation on investment in a panel of network industries. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe our empirical 
methodology. Section 3 describes the data and provides a discussion of the indicators of 
product market reforms that we exploit in our empirical analysis, focusing on the sources 
of variation that allow us to identify the relevant economic relationships. In Section 4 we 
present our main results on the impact of product market reforms on innovation, and also 
examine effects on productivity growth. A final section summarises and concludes. 
2  Empirical strategy  
Our empirical approach follows from the theoretical literature on product market 
competition and growth, which emphasises the importance of economic profits, or rents, 
in providing incentives for firms to innovate. Increased competition may increase 
incentives for incumbent firms to reduce slack,
5 or to innovate in order to protect or 
enhance their market position (i.e. to escape competition).
6 However, increased 
competition may also reduce the rewards to innovation or entry into a market, and thus 
discourage these activities.
7 The role of economic profits has also been emphasised in the 
existing empirical literature, for example, Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al (2005a,b).  
Product market reforms can affect competition through the intensity with which firms 
interact in the product market and through lowering the costs of entry. In equilibrium the 
level of rents will reflect both these factors. Competitive intensity between firms will drive 
prices down, while entry, or the threat of entry, will restrain firms from raising prices. In 
our empirical analysis we start from the premise that the primary impact of product market 
                                                 
5 See for example, Hart (1983) and Schmidt (1999). 
6 See, inter alia, Gilbert and Newbury (1982), Aghion et al (1997), Aghion et al (2001), and Aghion et al 
(2005a). 
7 This ‘Schumpeterian effect’ is at work in the growth models of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) and can be seen in models of rent dissipation, for example, Arrow (1962) and Tirole 
(1998).     6
reforms on innovation is through their effect on rents, i.e. the potential rewards from 
innovation. 
The two equations given in (1), describe the general relationship between product market 
reforms (PMR), the extent of product market competition (captured by the average level of 
profitability,µ ), and innovation (innov). 













where i indexes industry, j country, t time and X is a vector of other factors influencing 
these relationships. Our key identifying assumption is that we exclude most, or all, of our 
indicators of product market reforms from the innovation equation. We test the empirical 
validity of our exclusion restrictions, i.e. we test for direct effects of product market 
reforms on innovation, and we compare the results using the restricted model with those of 
an unrestricted reduced form.  
Our main empirical model thus takes the form of a two-stage instrumental variables 
specification, where we are interested in the estimated relationship in both stages. We 
assume a linear functional form for both equations. We begin by examining the 
relationship between product market reforms and the degree of product market 
competition as measured by the average level of profitability, given by:  
(2)   ijt ijt PMR it jt ijt PMR e µ βα η =+ + +  
where  ijt µ  is the average level of profitability (defined below) and ijt PMR  is a vector of 
indicators of product market reforms. We also include a full set of both industry-time 
dummies,  it α , and country-time dummies,  jt η . These control for industry-time specific 
and country-time specific unobservable factors that may be correlated with product market 
reforms. The parameters of interest are the β  coefficients on the product market reforms. 
The inclusion of industry-time and country-time dummies means that the β  coefficients 
are identified using differential variation over time within industries, within countries. If 
product market reforms are associated with increased competition (i.e. lower average 
profitability) we would expect these β  coefficients to be negative.     7
Equation (2) is used as the first-stage reduced-form in an instrumental variables estimation 
of the second-stage equation which characterises the relationship between competition and 
innovation: 
(3)   . ijt ijt it jt ijt innov u µ β µαη =+ + +  
The level of competition is unlikely to be the single major determinant of innovation in a 
country or industry. Factors such as infrastructure, skills and technological opportunity 
may play a much more important role, and we again include a full set of industry-time and 
country-time dummies in the second stage equation.  
To re-emphasise, we expect the immediate impact of product market reforms to be on the 
degree of product market competition that firms face, which we summarise in our measure 
of the average level of profitability. This in turn would be the main channel through which 
product market reforms affect innovation incentives. This leads to our exclusion 
restrictions - product market reforms do not directly enter equation (3). We test for any 
direct effects of product market reforms on innovation, as well as the indirect effect 
through their impact on the level of rents.
8  
As a final exercise we investigate effects of product market reforms on productivity 
growth on the basis that their main effect is to put pressure on firms to innovate and 
imitate. We estimate an equation that relates the growth rate of TFP to the intensity of 
innovation, following the approach of Griliches (1979) and others. As before we estimate 
this by instrumental variables where the excluded instruments are our measures of product 
market reforms, 
(4)  1112 1 . ijt I ijt ijt ijt it jt ijt TFP innov DTF β λµ λ α η ε −− − ∆= + + + + +  
In the simplest specification we exclude the average level of profitability from the TFP 
growth equation ( 1 0 λ = ). As before, we test the validity of this restriction. However, it is 
possible that product market competition increases productivity directly by forcing firms 
to increase their productive efficiency. We therefore consider a more general model where 
we include measures of both innovation and average profitability and instrument these two 
variables with the product market reforms. In all specifications we also include a measure 
                                                 
8 This is in contrast to, for example, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). That paper aggregates product market 
reforms into a single index, giving indicators equal weight. In this paper we use the estimated impact of 
product market reforms on rents as a way of aggregating the reforms.     8
of the distance to the technological frontier at the country-industry-year 
level 1 − ijt DTF capturing a country’s scope for technological catch-up, (measured by the 
difference in TFP with respect to the leading country within industry and year),
9 and 
industry-time and country-time dummies. We test for potential direct effects of product 
market reforms on productivity growth, for example through the reallocation of resources 
towards more productive firms or activities. 
It is likely that the error terms in equations (2), (3) and (4) exhibit some degree of 
autocorrelation. To allow for this our main results use Newey-West standard errors with a 
maximum lag length of 3 periods, and we test that our results are robust to clustering the 
standard errors at the country-industry level. 
3 Data 
We use measures of product market regulations and reforms, average profitability, 
innovation activity and productivity growth. We discuss these in turn. Our sample consists 
of an unbalanced panel of nine countries, (listed in Table 2), and 12 two-digit 
manufacturing industries over the period 1987-2000, for which we have data on all these 
variables. 
3.1  Product market regulations and reforms 
One of the main challenges in trying to identify the impact of product market competition 
on innovation is the endogeneity of competition - there may be reverse causality, with 
innovation affecting competitive conditions, and there may be omitted factors that are 
correlated with both innovation and competition. Product market reforms can provide 
useful exogenous variation and enable us to identify the causal impact of competition on 
innovation. In order to be useful, the reforms must have had sufficient variation, within 
countries and industries, over time. In addition, the effect of specific policies may be of 
direct interest to policy makers. 
The indicators of product market reforms that we use are based on the implementation of 
the European Single Market Programme (SMP) in the early 1990s. This was a large scale 
                                                 
9 See Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Aghion and Howitt (1998), Howitt (2000) and Griffith, Redding and Van 
Reenen (2004) for examples of research that emphasises the role of absorptive capacity and distance to the 
technological frontier.     9
project by the then members of the European Union to reduce internal non-tariff barriers 
to trade and other barriers to the free movement and factors of production across borders. 
The SMP was a large reform, and it was undertaken across a number of countries. It was, 
however, undertaken at around the same time across countries. This means that to identify 
the impact of the SMP from other contemporaneous macroeconomic effects (for example, 
the recession of the early 1990s in many European countries) we need to either include 
countries that were not involved in SMP as a control group, or use variation in the impact 
it had across different industries. We do both of these. We use the differential impact of 
the SMP across industries and countries as a source of exogenous variation in product 
market conditions, and include a control group of unaffected countries. 
Our data on the SMP is from a European Commission report by Buigues et al (1990).
10 
This is based on information contained in the 1988 Cecchini Report and other sources, 
including an extensive survey of businesses in the participating countries. The report 
identifies 3-digit industries that were expected ex-ante to be highly and moderately 
affected by the SMP, as well as the share of each of these industries in each country’s 
manufacturing employment over 1985-1987.
11 The researchers identified a common list of 
industries across all SMP countries, and then asked national experts from each country to 
add or remove sectors from the list according to whether the effects of the SMP were 
expected to be large or small in each sector in their country. Thus, for example, a sector 
would be removed from the list if it were already very open to international competition 
before the implementation of the SMP. Examples of such sectors include the aerospace 
industry in the UK and the brewing and malting industry in Denmark. 
There are therefore two sources of variation across SMP countries in the ex-ante expected 
impact of the SMP. First, the identified 3-digit sectors make up different shares of 
employment across countries in the 2-digit industries in our sample. A limitation of the 
analysis is that some of this variation may not be exogenous with respect to the outcomes 
we are measuring. However, much of the variation reflects longstanding differences in the 
share of particular activities in countries’ manufacturing activity. Second, the fact that 
some sectors have been removed from the list at the country level creates further variation 
                                                 
10 Aspects of this data have been used in various studies, including Mayes and Hart (1994), and Allen, 
Gasiorek and Smith (1998). We are not aware of any studies using the detailed industry-level data across 
several SMP countries. 
11 This information is contained in Table 26 in the Report’s statistical annex.     10
in the expected effects of the SMP across SMP countries. This variation stems from the 
fact that some countries had higher barriers to competition in some sectors than others at 
the start of the period. 
As well as variation across SMP countries, our main results also use non-SMP countries as 
controls for the impact of the SMP. This introduces a third source of variation in the data. 
However, we may be concerned about the suitability of non-SMP countries as controls for 
what would have happened in the SMP countries. We test the robustness of our main 
results to dropping non-SMP countries from the sample using only the first and second 
sources of variation described above. 
The sectors affected by the SMP fall into four main groups. Three of these were expected 
to be highly affected. The first is a group of “high-technology public procurement sectors” 
including telecommunications equipment, office machinery and medical and surgical 
equipment. The second and third are designated as “traditional public-procurement and 
regulated markets” and are split by the degree of measured price dispersion across 
countries prior to the SMP. The high price-dispersion group includes, amongst others, 
pharmaceutical products, and brewing and malting, while the low price dispersion group is 
dominated by shipbuilding and electrical machinery. Finally there is a fourth group of 
sectors that were expected to be moderately affected by the SMP, and which includes a 
range of consumer, investment and intermediate goods.  
We allow the estimated effects of the SMP to vary across these four groups of sectors. 
Table 1 shows the average share of each 2-digit industry in our sample that fell into each 
of the four groups in 1986, the year before the beginning of our sample period. These four 
variables across countries and industries are the instruments that we use in our empirical 
results, and in each case take the form of a step-function that is equal to zero in all years 
prior to 1992 and then rises in 1992 and all subsequent years to the country-industry 
specific share affected. The table shows that the first group of highly affected sectors are 
concentrated in the machinery and equipment industry, while the other groups are spread 
across a range of industries. Group 4 contains the most variation across industries, and this 
group contributes much of the explanatory power of our instruments. Only three of the 
twelve industries contain no affected sectors. In addition, as discussed above, non-SMP 
countries contain no affected sectors by definition, so the values of the instruments are 
equal to zero in all years in all industries in these countries.     11
[Table 1 here] 
We also explored the possibility of using another source of variation, which comes from 
the rate at which EU countries implemented the SMP. This information is contained in the 
transposition deficit, first published by the EU in 1997. On this basis we can group our 
SMP countries into two groups - three SMP countries with low values of the deficit (the 
UK, the Netherlands and Denmark) and two SMP countries with slightly higher values 
(France and Belgium). We experimented with refining our measures by multiplying all our 
instruments by the percentage of EU directives that were transposed into national law by 
each country by 1997 (i.e. we assume that 92.6% of all directives are implemented in 
France, and 96.5% in the UK). Using this additional source of variation leaves our results 
effectively unchanged, suggesting that this source of variation has little additional power 
in explaining average levels of profitability. 
3.2 Average  profitability 
As discussed above, the main channel through which product market reforms are expected 
to affect innovation outcomes is the level of rents, or economic profits, in the market. This 
is not straightforward to measure. We construct a measure of the average level of 
profitability at the country-industry level for manufacturing industries using the OECD 
STAN database, which provides information at the two-digit industry level on value-
added, labour and capital stocks. Boone (2000) shows that this measure of competition is 
preferred to most other commonly used measures. It is more theoretically robust, 
particularly than those based on market concentration and market shares, and it is the only 
commonly-used measure of competition that is available across countries. 









where all variables are in nominal prices. This simple measure can be shown to be 
equivalent to the measure proposed by Roeger (1995), and is equivalent to the price-cost 
margin or mark-up under the assumption of constant returns to scale, such that marginal     12
cost is equal to average cost.
 12  To the extent that there are increasing (decreasing) returns 
to scale this measure will be biased downwards (upwards) compared to the true mark-up 
that firms charge. While value-added and labour costs are observed in the data, capital 
costs are not. We construct a perpetual inventory measure of the capital stock using data 
on investment. For countries where capital deflators are not available we use cross-country 
averages of those that are available. We calculate the cost of capital assuming that capital 
flows freely across borders so that all countries face a world interest rate, for which we use 
the US long-term interest rate. In our main results we instrument average profitability with 
exogenous changes in competition, which should help to control for classical 
measurement error.  
Assuming that all countries face the same world interest rate might induce bias in the 
results if some countries have liberalised their credit markets during the period in a way 
that is correlated with reforms to product markets. We check the sensitivity of our main 
results to the alternative assumptions of closed capital markets or a constant cost of capital 
across countries. The results are not very sensitive to different ways of constructing the 
cost of capital, and the main conclusions are robust to these alternatives. 
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of the profitability variable 
across manufacturing industries and time for each country in our sample, (we discuss the 
remaining columns in Section 3.3). There is wide, and sometimes surprising, variation in 
the average level of profitability across countries. For example, on average the US has one 
of the highest levels, which runs counter to our intuition about the degree of competition 
in the US and Europe. There are various data incompatibilities in the measurement of 
capital and value-added across countries that affect the cross-section variation in the 
average level of profitability. For this reason it is important that we include country-time 
dummies when we estimate equation (2). Note that, as stressed above, our results are 
based on time-series variation in profitability within country-industries. 
[Table 2 here] 
The second perhaps surprising feature of measured profitability is that it appears to trend 
upwards over time for most countries. At first this may seem to conflict with most 
                                                 
12 See Klette (1999) for a discussion. We use a measure of the mark-up over value added rather than over 
sales for reasons of data availability, but the results are not affected by using the mark-up over sales for 
those observations where both are available.     13
preconceptions about changes to the degree of competition associated with product market 
reforms, globalisation and opening to trade. This has been noted in the literature, and one 
explanation, discussed in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Boulhol (2004), is that 
upward trending measured rents could be a short term response to reductions in the 
bargaining power of workers.
13 There are a range of other factors that might explain 
upwards trending profitability over time, including increases in returns to scale. However, 
what is important from our point of view is that differential changes in profitability across 
countries and industries can be shown to be related to product market reforms in ways that 
accord with theory. We discuss this further in the results section. 
Another feature of our measure of profitability is that it is generally pro-cyclical. We 
include country-time dummies in all regressions to control for this. We might be 
concerned that this will not remove all of the cyclical variation in profitability. However, 
any excess pro-cyclicality in profitability would be likely to induce a positive bias in our 
OLS estimates. For example, if R&D or productivity growth is pro-cyclical, excess 
cyclicality in average profitability could bias the coefficient on profitability in a positive 
direction, which means that the size of our results would be understated (we find negative 
coefficients on average profitability). In addition, when we instrument profitability with 
our indicators of product market reforms, the estimated coefficient becomes more negative 
in almost all cases. This is consistent with the possibility that the IV estimates control for 
measurement error in profitability that is associated with excess cyclicality.  
3.3  Measuring innovative activity and total factor productivity growth  
Our main measure of innovation activity is Business Enterprise R&D (BERD) expenditure 
from the OECD ANBERD database. There is substantial variation in business sector R&D 
intensity both across and within countries. For example, between 1981 and 2001 BERD as 
a percentage of GDP in Finland increased by over 1.5 percentage points, whereas in the 
UK it actually decreased by 0.25 percentage points. In our empirical analysis we use these 
data at the country-industry-year level. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 show the means 
and standard deviations for the two indicators of innovation activity that we use in our 
                                                 
13 The intuition is that declining bargaining power reduces the share of rents captured by workers as higher 
wages, and increases the share that is measured in firms’ profits. In the long term, the increase in 
profitability associated with declining workers’ bargaining power would be expected to lead to entry and a 
reduction of rents to their previous level, but to the extent that these effects occur with lags it is possible for 
the rent transfer effect to dominate the entry effect during the transition period.     14
analysis: R&D intensity, R&D expenditure as a percentage of value-added, which is our 
main measure; and log real R&D expenditure which we use as a robustness check. 
We measure the growth of total factor productivity growth using a superlative index 
(Caves et al, 1982a,b). The data come from the OECD STAN database, which provides 
information at the two-digit industry level on value-added, labour and capital stocks. The 
growth rate of TFP for a country-industry is defined as 
(6)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 / ln ~ 1 / ln ~ / ln − − − − − − − − = ∆ ijt ijt t ijt ijt ijt t ijt ijt ijt ijt K K L L V V TFP α α , 
where V denotes real value-added (converted to US dollars using an economy-wide PPP), 
1 ,
~
− t ijt α  is the average labour share over t and t-1, 
() 1 1 , 2
1 ~
− − + = ijt ijt t ijt α α α , 
L is numbers employed and K is capital stock (converted to US dollars using an economy-
wide PPP). One concern that is often expressed in the literature is that the measured share 
of labour in value-added can be quite volatile. This is suggestive of measurement error, so 
we check that our main results are robust to the adjustment suggested by Harrigan (1997). 
This involves exploiting the properties of the translog production function to smooth the 
observed labour shares.
14  The final column of Table (2) provides descriptive information 
on our TFP growth measure.  
As a robustness check we also construct a measure of TFP growth that allows for 
imperfect competition following Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995). It is well known that 
imperfect competition can lead to bias in measured TFP. In the presence of positive mark-
ups, measured TFP growth will be biased upwards or downwards depending on whether 
capital per worker is increasing or decreasing over time. In the empirical section we show 
that our results are not significantly affected by adjusting our TFP measure for the 
presence of positive mark-ups. 
                                                 
14 Under the assumption of a translog production function and standard market-clearing conditions, the 
labour share can be expressed as a function of the capital-labour ratio and a country-industry constant. If 
actual labour shares deviate from their true values by an i.i.d. measurement error term, then the parameters 
of this equation can be estimated by fixed effects panel data estimation, where we allow the coefficient on 
the capital-labour ratio to vary across industries j. The fitted values from this equation are then used as the 
labour cost shares in our calculation of TFP growth.     15
4 Empirical  results 
We now turn to our empirical results. We first discuss the impact of product market 
reforms on product market competition and R&D, including a number of robustness 
checks. Then in section 4.2 we discuss our results for productivity growth.  
4.1  The impact of product market reforms on R&D  
We start by considering the relationship between product market reforms and profitability, 
the first stage of the IV estimation, in Table 3. In column (1) we include separate country 
dummies, industry dummies and time dummies. In column (2) we include country-time 
and industry-time dummies, meaning that we identify the coefficients of interest on the 
indicators of product market reform from variation in these indicators over time within 
country-industries. We see that each of the four SMP indicators is associated with lower 
profitability, and that this relationship appears stronger in the more highly affected sectors 
(SMP groups 1 to 3), though is only statistically significant in the cases of groups 2 and 
4.
15 The partial R
2s and F-tests at the bottom of the Table show that the instruments have 
explanatory power. For example the value of the F-statistic for the four SMP variables in 
column (2) is above the critical values for the test of weak instruments provided by Stock 
and Yogo (2004). 
[Table 3 here] 
In column (3) we repeat the specification in column (1) but include only SMP countries in 
the estimation sample. This removes one source of variation in our data – the use of non-
SMP countries as a control group. Thus we are attempting to identify the effects of the 
SMP purely from variation across participant countries in the expected impact of the SMP 
on affected industries. The main effect on the results is that we no longer find a significant 
effect on profitability from the group 2 sectors. However, a strong negative impact from 
the moderately affected sectors, group 4, remains and provides most of the explanatory 
power. As can be seen in Table 1, a number of industries are categorised as moderately 
affected sectors, providing substantial variation in our data. However, the F-test and 
                                                 
15 In our main results we use Newey-West standard errors with the maximum lag length set to three periods 
to allow for serial correlation in the error term. In addition the results are generally robust to clustering the 
standard errors by country-industry to allow for arbitrary correlation within country-industries. For example, 
the standard error on SMP group 2 in column (1) of Table 3 increases from 0.110 to 0.164 in this case, while 
that on SMP group 4 increases from 0.032 to 0.039.     16
partial R
2 are significantly lower than in the first two columns, indicating the possibility of 
weak instruments when we restrict the sample to the SMP participant countries. 
We now turn to the relationship between competition and innovation in Table 4 where 
R&D intensity is the dependent variable. In the OLS specification in column (1) we find a 
small effect of competition (lower profitability) on R&D intensity. Column (2) shows IV 
results, which indicate a much stronger relationship between increased competition and 
innovation. This suggests an upwards bias in the OLS results, for example due to reverse 
causality from R&D intensity to profitability, or possibly as a result of attenuation bias. 
However, the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions (i.e. whether the SMP variables 
can be excluded from the R&D regression) is rejected in this specification. This is due to a 
direct negative effect of the SMP on R&D in group 1 sectors, as shown in column (3). 
Buigues et al. (1990) say the group 1 activities “are characterised by considerable 
economies of scale which are not always properly exploited at Community level, and by 
large R&D budgets in which the lack of cooperation between European companies 
constitutes a handicap” (p. 23). This raises the possibility that consolidation and 
rationalisation across countries in these sectors following the SMP may have reduced 
R&D expenditure. 
[Table 4 here] 
In column (4) we examine the direct reduced form impact of the SMP variables on 
innovation. We see that the coefficients are roughly consistent with the two-stage IV 
results. For example, combining the coefficient of -0.137 on the moderately affected 
sectors (group 4) in column (2) of Table 3 with the coefficient of -0.452 on profitability in 
column (3) of Table 4 suggests an indirect impact on R&D intensity of about 0.06, which 
is close to the direct estimated impact of 0.063 in column (4) of Table 4. 
What do these results imply about the economic magnitude of our estimated effects? The 
coefficient on profitability in column (3) of Table 4 suggests that a one percentage point 
fall in profitability is associated with on average about a 0.45 percentage point increase in 
R&D intensity. Consider the impact of the SMP on the chemicals industry in the UK, for 
example, one of the most highly affected industries in the sample. 30% of the industry fell 
into Group 2 of highly affected sectors, while a further 39% of the industry fell into Group 
4 of moderately affected sectors. Combining these numbers with the coefficients on the 
SMP variables in column (2) of Table 3, our estimates predict that the SMP was     17
associated with average profitability in the sector that was 16 percentage points lower than 
in the absence of the SMP. In fact the average level of profitability in the sector in the UK 
only fell by about 1 percentage point over the period, but this is in stark contrast to the 
increases experienced in some other non-SMP countries such as Finland and the US, 
where average profitability in the sector rose by 15 and 13 percentage points respectively. 
Combining this effect with the coefficient on profitability in column (3) of Table 4 
suggests that the SMP was associated with R&D intensity that was 7.3 percentage points 
higher than in the absence of the SMP. We can compare this to the reduced form 
coefficients on the SMP variables in column (4) of Table 4, which also generate a 
predicted increase in R&D intensity of 7.3 percentage points. The actual increase in R&D 
intensity in the industry over the period was just over 10 percentage points (from 12.4% in 
1987 to 22.8% in 2000). Thus, while many other factors may have affected R&D intensity 
in this industry in the UK over the period, both our IV and reduced form estimates suggest 
that in the absence of the SMP it would have increased by far less than it did. 
4.1.1 Robustness 
Table 5 shows our first robustness check using log real R&D expenditure instead of R&D 
intensity. We do this to ensure that our results are not driven by the impact of the SMP on 
output (i.e. the denominator of R&D intensity). The results support those in Table 4 using 
R&D intensity. We start in column (1) with OLS results. In column (2) we use all four 
SMP variables as excluded instruments. The Hansen J-test rejects the over-identifying 
restrictions, and in column (3) we see that, we again cannot exclude a direct effect of the 
SMP on log real R&D expenditure in group 1 sectors. As before, the estimated coefficient 
on profitability becomes significantly more negative in the IV specification. Column (4) 
contains the reduced form.  
[Table 5 here] 
We next test the robustness of the relationships estimated above to using only the sample 
of SMP countries. The results above use non-SMP countries as controls, as well as 
variation in the effects of the SMP across industries in the SMP countries. In Table 6 we 
show equivalent results using only the SMP countries, thus using only the latter form of 
variation. We use the first stage IV estimation from column (3) of Table 3 discussed 
above. The key result is that the estimated coefficient on profitability in column (3) of 
Table 6 is similar to that in Table 4. Note that in column (2) with the full set of     18
instruments the Hansen J test rejects the over-identifying restrictions. When we include 
SMP Group 2 (traditional public procurement and regulated markets, high price 
dispersion) directly in column (3), the over-identification test no longer rejects. This is 
consistent with the reduced form results in column (4) and the first stage results in column 
(3) of Table 3; the SMP is positively associated with R&D intensity in Group 2 sectors 
within the participant countries, but not negatively associated with the level of 
profitability. Thus, when we restrict the sample to participant countries, the hypothesis 
that the only effect of the SMP on innovation in these industries is through its impact on 
profitability is rejected by the data. This was not the case in Table 4 when we included 
non-SMP countries as controls. 
A number of other features of the results in Table 6 are worth noting. First, the reduced 
form coefficients in column (4) are very similar to those in Table 4 for Groups 1 and 4, but 
we no longer find evidence of a direct negative impact of the SMP on R&D intensity in 
group 1, and there is no evidence of a positive impact in Group 3. In addition, the F-
statistics and partial R
2s in columns (2) and (3) suggest that the instruments are fairly 
weak when we remove the additional variation provided by non-SMP countries. However, 
the estimated coefficient on profitability is very similar to that in Table 4, suggesting that 
any weak instruments bias may be fairly small in this case. 
[Table 6 here] 
4.2  Product market reforms and productivity growth 
Finally, we briefly consider the effect of product market reforms on productivity growth 
through their effect on R&D, and examine whether there is any evidence for a direct effect 
of the degree of product market competition productivity growth.
16 
In columns (1) and (3) of Table 7, which show OLS specifications, we find a positive 
association between R&D intensity and TFP growth and between competition (lower 
profitability) and TFP growth. We also include a measure of industries’ distance to the 
technological frontier and find that country-industries that are further from the frontier 
experience faster TFP growth. This is consistent with productivity convergence, for 
example if countries further behind the frontier are more able to benefit from imitation and 
                                                 
16 Note that the sample is slightly smaller than above because we lose the first year of data. This is because 
the independent variables are all lagged by one period.     19
adoption of technologies developed near to the frontier. In columns (2) and (4) we 
instrument R&D intensity and profitability with our SMP indicators, (the reduced forms 
are similar to those in column (2) of Table 3 and column (4) of Table 4.) The IV estimates 
of the impact of R&D on TFP growth (column (4)) are significantly larger than the OLS 
estimates, while the IV estimate of the impact of profitability is not significant.
17 Finally 
column (5) presents the reduced form impact of the instruments on TFP growth.  
A number of features of these results are worth noting. First, the results in column (2) 
suggest that product market reforms associated with the SMP raised productivity growth 
through their impact on R&D intensity. However, it is not immediately clear why the IV 
coefficient on R&D intensity in column (2) should be significantly larger than the OLS 
coefficient. One possibility is measurement error in R&D, but this is unlikely to account 
for such a large OLS bias. Another possible explanation is that the IV estimate in column 
(2) corresponds to a local average treatment effect (LATE) in the context of heterogeneous 
returns to R&D across industries.
18 For example, if the average rate of return to R&D is 
significantly higher in those industries where our instruments display most variation, this 
could explain why the IV estimate of the coefficient on R&D intensity is larger than the 
OLS estimate.
19 This would be problematic if our aim was to use our instruments to 
estimate the average effect of R&D on productivity growth across all sectors. However, 
given that we are interested precisely in the impact that the SMP had on productivity 
growth in affected sectors through its impact on R&D, a local average treatment effect is 
exactly the parameter of interest in this case. 
Secondly, the results in column (4) suggest that there is no significant direct impact of 
profitability on productivity growth once profitability is instrumented with the SMP 
indicators. However, the F-statistic suggests that the instruments may be too weak to 
                                                 
17 The results are very similar using our measure of TFP growth adjusted for imperfect competition. For 
example the estimated coefficient (standard error) on R&D intensity in column (4) is equal to 0.829 (0.264) 
while the coefficient (standard error) on profitability is equal to 0.125 (0.095). 
18 In the context of heterogeneous returns across industries, an IV estimate can be interpreted as a weighted 
average of the returns in the sample, where the “weights” are the relative size of the increment in the 
endogenous variable induced by the instruments. See Imbens and Angrist (1994) for a discussion of LATE 
estimates, or Card (2001) for a discussion in the context of the returns to education. 
19 To investigate this possibility we split the sample into country-industries where our instruments display 
variation over time and those where they do not. The former group contains 394 out of 1008 observations. 
The coefficient (standard error) on R&D intensity for this sample is 0.235 (0.050), while the coefficient 
(standard error) in the latter group is –0.001 (0.039). The fact that the coefficient is significantly higher in 
those industries where our instruments display variation is consistent with a local average treatment effect 
interpretation of the difference between the OLS and IV estimates.     20
separately identify both the impact of profitability and R&D intensity, so this result may 
not be robust.  
Finally, the reduced form estimates in column (5) find a direct positive effect of the SMP 
on productivity growth only in Group 2 of highly affected industries. In line with our 
findings on R&D intensity there is also evidence of a direct negative effect of the SMP in 
high-tech public procurement sectors (Group 1). 
What is the economic magnitude of these effects? The coefficient on R&D intensity in 
column (2) of Table 7 suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in R&D intensity is 
associated with about a 0.6 percentage point increase in TFP growth.
20 As an example, the 
size of this effect is similar to the predicted impact of the SMP on the metal products 
industry in the UK: 7.5% of the industry fell into Group 2 of highly affected sectors, and 
the coefficient on SMP Group 2 in column (4) of Table 4 is 0.163, suggesting that the 
SMP program was associated with a 1.2 percentage point increase in R&D intensity in the 
industry as a whole. This in turn was associated with about a 0.7 percentage point increase 
in TFP growth.
21 The actual average increase in TFP growth in the metal products industry 
was 1.7 percentage points, from 2.5% to 4.2%, so the predicted impact of the SMP can 
explain just over one third of this. These seem plausible effects. 
5 Summary  and  conclusions 
In this paper we have presented evidence that suggests that the EU Single Market 
Programme reduced the average level of profitability in those industries and countries that 
were affected, and that this had a positive impact on innovative activity in these industries 
and countries, which in turn affected total factor productivity growth. These relationships 
accord well with economic theory.  
We interpret the results on profitability as indicating that the Single Market Programme 
implemented product market reforms that reduced the extent to which firms could charge 
prices above costs (and so reduced profitability). This is supported by our evidence. If the 
main impact of the SMP was instead through reductions in input costs, then the impact 
                                                 
20 Following Griliches (1979) we could also interpret this as suggesting that the social rate of return to R&D 
is about 60%, assuming that spillovers occur only within industries. This is similar to other estimates in the 
literature. 
21 This is 0.012 times the coefficient on R&D intensity in column (2) of Table 7 of 0.598.     21
would be expected to be felt across all industries, and not concentrated in those industries 
highlighted in the Buigues et al. report. 
Our results have a bearing on the expected effects of possible future reforms, for example 
those being considered under the Lisbon Agenda. Our findings suggest that reforms that 
put pressure on firm profitability are likely to lead to increased innovation, all else equal. 
This suggests that such reforms could at least go some way towards increasing innovation 
intensity within the EU. 
However, it is important to note that many other factors are also likely to have affected 
innovative activity and productivity growth over the period we have considered. These 
include human capital, infrastructure (broadly defined), and a range of other institutional 
factors. These may interact with product market conditions - for example, poorly 
functioning financial markets may restrict firms’ ability to respond to increased 
competition. The role of credit and labour market regulations, and other institutions, in 
determining the impact of reforms to product markets would be an interesting topic for 
further research. 
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Industries in SMP countries        
   15-16: Food, beverages and tobacco  0  9.1  7.4  0  83.4 
   17-19: Textiles, leather and footwear  0  0  0  62.4  37.6 
   21-22: Pulp, paper, printing and publishing  0  0  0  0  100 
   23: Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel  0  0  0  0  100 
   24: Chemicals and chemical products  0  31.1  0  59.8  9.1 
   25: Rubber and plastics  0  0  0  26.1  73.9 
   26: Other non-metallic minerals  0  0  0  40.4  59.6 
   27: Basic metals  0  0  0  0  100 
   28: Metal products  0  6.4  0  0  93.6 
   29-33: Machinery and equipment   32.0  0  11.3  39.3  17.3 
   34: Motor vehicles  0  0  0  97.4  2.6 
   35: Other transport equipment  0  7.0  27.8  38.1  27.0 
        
All industries in non-SMP countries  0  0  0  0  100  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 


















        
Belgium  1.214  0.051 4.489 0.011  95 
  (0.169)  (0.050) (1.396) (0.091)   
Canada  1.314  0.033 4.892 0.021  161 
  (0.231)  (0.049) (1.409) (0.050)   
Denmark  1.128  0.043 5.331 0.010  91 
  (0.076)  (0.058) (1.853) (0.064)   
Finland  1.199  0.050 3.601 0.029  140 
  (0.197)  (0.042) (1.234) (0.064)   
France  1.213  0.105 5.978 0.016  82 
  (0.186)  (0.160) (1.230) (0.097)   
United Kingdom  1.146  0.061 5.435 0.020  150 
  (0.117)  (0.065) (1.556) (0.050)   
Netherlands  1.248  0.041 4.126 0.012  136 
  (0.161)  (0.050) (1.686) (0.065)   
Norway  1.053  0.041 5.045 0.007  108 
  (0.107)  (0.043) (1.380) (0.061)   
United States  1.241  0.078 7.967 0.016  154 
  (0.200)  (0.099) (1.615) (0.058)   
        
Total  1.203  0.055 5.228 0.017 1117 
  (0.187)  (0.075) (1.963) (0.065)   
        
Notes: The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 12 two-digit industries over 9 countries for the 
period 1987-2000. Profitability is as specified in equation (5). R&D is Business Enterprise Research 
and Development (BERD). Growth in TFP is as specified in equation (6). 
 
 
 Table 3: First stage reduced form: profitability and the SMP 
Dep. var.: profitability  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Full sample  Full sample  SMP countries only 
     
SMP Group 1  -0.173  -0.247  -0.163 
 (0.122)  (0.162)  (0.174) 
SMP Group 2  -0.295  -0.358  -0.050 
 (0.110)***  (0.102)***  (0.090) 
SMP Group 3  -0.042  -0.273  -0.220 
 (0.181)  (0.210)  (0.304) 
SMP Group 4  -0.109  -0.137  -0.157 
 (0.032)***  (0.040)***  (0.053)*** 
     
Country dummies  Yes  No  No 
Industry dummies  Yes  No  No 
Year dummies  Yes  No  No 
Country-year dummies  No  Yes  Yes 
Industry-year dummies  No  Yes  Yes 
     
F-statistic 10.85  12.25  2.74 
Partial R-squared  0.039  0.051  0.027 
     
Observations 1117  1117  554 
R-squared 0.49  0.59  0.58 
Notes: Robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets with maximum lag length set to 3; the sample in 
columns (1) and (2) consists of 12 two-digit industries or groups of industries across 9 countries (5 are 
SMP countries - Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK - and 4 are non-SMP 
countries - Canada, Finland, Norway and the USA) over the years 1987-2000. In column (3) only the 5 
SMP countries are included.  
F-statistic is a test of the joint significance of the SMP variables. The partial R-squared is for the SMP 
variables. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
SMP Group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets; SMP Group 2:Traditional public procurement 
and regulated markets (high price dispersion); SMP Group 3: Traditional public procurement and 















 Table 4: R&D intensity 
Dep.  var.:  R&D/VA    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS  IV  IV  Reduced  Form 
      
Profitability    -0.073 -0.295 -0.452   
  (0.024)*** (0.088)*** (0.114)***   
SMP Group 1      -0.245  -0.190 
     (0.091)***  (0.064)*** 
SMP  Group  2      0.163 
      (0.031)*** 
SMP  Group  3      0.347 
      (0.147)** 
SMP  Group  4      0.063 
      (0.018)*** 
      
Country-year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
F-statistic  - 12.25  13.11 - 
Partial  R-squared  - 0.051  0.042 - 
Hansen J test    -  11.93  2.27  - 
(p-value)   (0.008)  (0.322)   
      
Observations  1117 1117 1117 1117 
R-squared  0.67 0.64 0.64 0.69 
Notes: Robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets with maximum lag length set to 3; the sample 
consists of 12 two-digit industries or groups of industries across 9 countries over the period 1987-
2000.  
F-statistic is a test of the joint significance of the excluded SMP variables in the first stage regression; 
the partial R-squared is for the SMP variables in the first stage regression (see Table 3). The Hansen J 
test is a test of the exclusion restrictions. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP Group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets; SMP Group 2:Traditional public procurement 
and regulated markets (high price dispersion); SMP Group 3: Traditional public procurement and 
















 Table 5: Log real R&D 
Dep.  var.:  ln(R&D)    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS  IV  IV  Reduced  Form 
      
Profitability    -0.522 -4.790 -5.901   
 (0.298)*  (0.991)***  (1.302)***   
SMP Group 1      -3.318  -2.028 
     (1.255)***  (0.643)*** 
SMP  Group  2      1.522 
      (0.481)*** 
SMP  Group  3      1.898 
      (1.190) 
SMP  Group  4      1.149 
      (0.231)*** 
      
Country-year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
F-statistic  - 12.25  13.11 - 
Partial  R-squared  - 0.051  0.042 - 
Hansen J test    -  11.85  1.66  - 
(p-value)   (0.008)  (0.436)   
      
Observations  1117 1117 1117 1117 
R-squared  0.89 0.85 0.83 0.90 
Notes: Robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets with maximum lag length set to 3; the sample 
consists of 12 two-digit industries or groups of industries across 9 countries over the period 1987-
2000.  
F-statistic is a test of the joint significance of the excluded SMP variables in the first stage regression; 
the partial R-squared is for the SMP variables in the first stage regression (see Table 3). The Hansen J 
test is a test of the exclusion restrictions. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP Group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets; SMP Group 2:Traditional public procurement 
and regulated markets (high price dispersion); SMP Group 3: Traditional public procurement and 
















 Table 6: R&D intensity, SMP countries only 
Dep.  var.:  R&D/VA    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS  IV  IV  Reduced  Form 
      
Profitability    -0.124 -0.474 -0.435   
  (0.034)*** (0.141)*** (0.135)***   
SMP  Group  1      0.126 
      (0.056)** 
SMP Group 2      0.128  0.146 
     (0.052)**  (0.045)*** 
SMP  Group  3      -0.225 
      (0.240) 
SMP  Group  4      0.063 
      (0.037)* 
      
Country-year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
F-statistic -  2.74  3.63  - 
Partial  R-squared  - 0.027  0.026 - 
Hansen J test    -  8.18  4.37  - 
(p-value)   (0.042)  (0.112)   
      
Observations  554 554 554 554 
R-squared  0.85 0.77 0.79 0.85 
Notes: Robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets with maximum lag length set to 3; the sample 
consists of 12 two-digit industries or groups of industries across 9 countries over the period 1987-
2000.  
F-statistic is a test of the joint significance of the excluded SMP variables in the first stage regression; 
the partial R-squared is for the SMP variables in the first stage regression (see Table 3). The Hansen J 
test is a test of the exclusion restrictions. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP Group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets; SMP Group 2:Traditional public procurement 
and regulated markets (high price dispersion); SMP Group 3: Traditional public procurement and 














 Table 7: TFP growth 
Dep Var.: TFP growth  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  OLS IV OLS IV  Reduced  form 
       
R&D/VA  0.119 0.598 0.075 0.802   
 (0.036)***  (0.149)***  (0.034)**  (0.255)***   
Profitability       -0.085  0.084   
     (0.013)***  (0.091)   
Distance to frontier  0.037  0.055  0.044  0.053  0.034 
 (0.007)***  (0.010)***  (0.007)*** (0.012)*** (0.007)*** 
SMP  Group  1       -0.120 
       (0.034)*** 
SMP  Group  2       0.078 
       (0.033)** 
SMP  Group  3       0.050 
       (0.050) 
SMP  Group  4       0.017 
       (0.011) 
       
Country-year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
F-statistic -  11.11  -  4.50  - 
Partial  R-squared  (1)  - 0.052 - 0.033 - 
Partial R-squared (2)  -  -  -  0.028  - 
Hansen J test    -  1.76  -  0.65  - 
(p-value)   (0.624)  (0.723)  
       
Observations  1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 
R-squared  0.42 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.43 
Notes: Robust Newey-West standard errors in brackets with maximum lag length set to 3; the sample 
consists of 12 two-digit industries or groups of industries across 9 countries over the period 1988-
2000.  
F-statistic is the Cragg-Donald F-statistic, a measure of the power of the  excluded SMP variables in 
the first stage regressions; the partial R-squareds are for the SMP variables in the first stage 
regressions for R&D intensity and profitability respectively. The Hansen J test is a test of the exclusion 
restrictions. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP Group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets; SMP Group 2:Traditional public procurement 
and regulated markets (high price dispersion); SMP Group 3: Traditional public procurement and 
regulated markets (low price dispersion); SMP Group 4: Moderately affected sectors 
 
 
 
 